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A religious revolution?
How Socrates’ theology undermined the practice of sacrifice1
Anna Lännström, Stonehill College
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at its 2010 meeting with the
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association
It is generally accepted that Socrates’ religious views were at least somewhat
unconventional and that they may have seemed threatening to other Athenians.2
Pinpointing in what ways Socrates’ views were unconventional and in what ways they
threatened conventional Athenian religion, however, has proven difficult. This is partly
because Socrates’ religious views have been hotly debated over the centuries. Furthermore,
through the work of Mark McPherran and others, philosophers have become increasingly
aware that Athenian religion is not simply reducible to belief in the erratic Homeric twelve.
We are now much more likely to recognize the complexity of Athenian religion, as well as
its tendencies towards orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy. Taking Athenian religion’s focus
on orthopraxy seriously, some scholars have argued that Socrates’ views were threatening
at least in part due to their consequences for religious practice.3 This paper examines Mark
McPherran’s and Gregory Vlastos’ arguments that Socrates’ theology threatened Athenian
sacrificial practices because it rejected the so-called do ut des principle (I give that you
may give, aka the principle of reciprocity).4
The first part of this paper summarizes Vlastos’ and McPherran’s arguments. The
second provides a brief overview of sacrifice in Athens and then argues that Vlastos’ and
McPherran’s arguments are flawed because they assume that the Athenians understood
sacrifice in terms of the do ut des principle.5 Drawing upon scholarship in anthropology
and religious studies, I argue that we need to revise that understanding of sacrifice and
that, once we do, McPherran’s and Vlastos’ arguments no longer show that Socrates
would have been a significant threat to the practice of sacrifice. The final part argues that
McPherran’s Socrates does undermine sacrifice, but not for the reasons that McPherran
suggests. Rather, he undermines sacrifice by making external actions irrelevant to piety.
Part 1: Background and summary of McPherran and Vlastos
Sacrifices were an integral part of the life and religious practices of Athens, and
state sacrifices were organized in an extensive calendar.6 Because sacrifices were one of
The full version of this paper is forthcoming in Ancient Philosophy.
After all, he was found guilty of not acknowledging [nomizein] the gods of the city and of introducing new
deities.
The term nomizein can mean either “believe in” or “acknowledge,” indicating a charge of heterodoxy or
heteropraxy respectively. Cf. Burnet (note to Apology 24c1, 184), Garland (1992) and McPherran’s response
to Garland (2002, 164).
Vlastos (1991); McPherran (2002). None of them suggest that this was the only way in which Socrates’
religious views deviated from the norm or that concerns about the sacrifices really did motivate the trial. I’ll
focus largely on McPherran’s more extended argument.
Gocer also notes that do ut des is not the right way of understanding the relationship between gods and
humans in Greece (2000, 122). Her discussion is very brief, however, and so she does not provide an
extended argument for this view.
Sources on sacrifice in ancient Greece abound; see especially Bowie (1995), Bremmer (2007), Jameson
(1988), Mikalson (1983 and 2010), Price (1999), and Zaidman and Pantel (1989).
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the primary ways in which the gods were honored, changes to them were a serious
matter, often done only with the approval by the Delphic oracle.7 A few years before
Socrates’ trial, Nicomachus was asked to revise Solon’s sacrificial calendar for Athens,
and was then brought to trial on impiety charges. The prosecutor argued that one must
make no changes whatsoever to the calendar.8 We should not infer that the sacrifices
were never changed. After all, Nicomachus was asked by the city to make the revisions.
Changes were made fairly regularly, for financial or for other reasons. Still, advocating
changes to the sacrifices could be a sensitive and risky matter.9
Now, neither McPherran nor Vlastos believe that Socrates set out to reform the
sacrifices in the direct way that Nicomachus did. The threat he posed was indirect; his
theology undermined sacrifices by suggesting that they would not sway the gods. Vlastos
argues that Socrates would abandon sacrifice completely, replacing it with moral
philosophy (1991, 175).
McPherran greatly expands and revises Vlastos’ argument. Other than his greater
caution and more moderate tone, the main difference is that, unlike Vlastos, McPherran
believes that Socrates retained a role for prayer and sacrifice. He argues, following Yunis
(1988), that Athenian religion was organized around three core beliefs: The gods exist;
they take notice of human affairs; and they respond to our sacrifices and prayers (2002,
170). McPherran describes the Greek religious practice of sacrifice as follows:
[The practice] often centered on prayers to a divinity, and these almost always
involved a request for a particular (not general) and materially manifested good.
. . . However, like any superior, it was thought useful to put such supernatural
assistants in one’s debt first in order to “enlist” them in one’s cause (or to reward
them subsequent to their services). Thus, it was typical to accompany a prayer of
request with an offering of some sort designed to establish a claim on the
“helper” . . . As Euthyphro confesses to Socrates (Euth. 14c-15a), this do ut des –
“I give so that you will give” – conception of reciprocity between gods and
humans is rather like an art of commerce (emporikê; 14e8). (2002, 165)
As Socrates forced Euthyphro to admit, then, traditional Greek sacrifice was a transaction
in which people paid for the gods’ help with their sacrifices. McPherran argues that this
do ut des conception of sacrifice is supported by the traditional view of justice as
reciprocation (lex talionis) according to which you should repay a gift for a gift and an
evil for an evil (ibid.). The point of the sacrifices was to put the gods in your debt,
making them feel that they have to help you next time. This may mean helping you with
your crops or against the plague, but it may also include helping you take revenge on
your enemies. Finally, McPherran argues that passages from texts like the Iliad, Medea,
the Republic, and the Laws suggest that the Athenians believed that the gods could be
persuaded to violate lex talionis (ibid., 170).10
In McPherran’s view, Socrates accepted the first two core beliefs of Athenian
religion: the gods exist and they care about the affairs of human beings. However, his
theology required him to reject (or at least radically modify) the belief that the gods
See Isocrates Areopagiticus 7.29-30; the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander (1423a-b). Cf.
Mikalson (2010, 171) and Price (1985, 144).
Lysias 30, 18.
Cf. Mikalson (ibid.).
He notes that other texts suggest that the gods could not be persuaded in this way.
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respond to sacrifices. Since the gods are just, they simply cannot be persuaded to assist
with an unjust action, no matter what sacrifices we offer them. On this point, then,
McPherran argues, Socrates departed from the traditional Greek view; he rejected do ut
des sacrifice.
Vlastos concluded that Socrates rejected the Athenian tradition of sacrifice
altogether. McPherran disagrees, arguing that Vlastos is wrong to assume that do ut des
was the only Greek views of sacrifice (ibid, 171). While do ut des was the dominant
view, there was also a second, non-mercantile view, according to which gods are
influenced not by the size of the sacrifice but by the character and virtue of the petitioner
(ibid.). And this view would of course be much more conducive to a Socratic
interpretation.
Thus, for McPherran, Socrates’ revolution was not a threat to all cult as Vlastos
suggests. He was a threat to those who thought that the point of cult was to bribe the gods
with big material sacrifices. Still, like Vlastos, McPherran understands sacrifice as a do ut
des transaction. He explicitly equates the gods’ responding to sacrifice with a do ut des
cult: “[The gods] will respond to some of our actions ... especially our prayers and
sacrificial offerings (that is, they are gods with a do ut des cult)” (2002, 168, emphasis
added).11 And because he understands sacrifice in that way, McPherran agrees with
Vlastos that the implications of Socrates’ critique of sacrifice cut “straight at the root of
some of the popular traditional motivations underlying many cult practices” (ibid., 174)
and that Socrates “revolutionized the traditional notions of piety and ‘honoring’” (ibid.,
172).
Part 2: Critique of the do ut des view of sacrifice
McPherran and Vlastos’ position comes down to two claims: the Athenian
institution of sacrifice was largely a do ut des practice, and Socrates rejected all (Vlastos)
or the dominant part (McPherran) of it. I agree that Socrates would have found this sort
of transaction between man and god completely unacceptable. But I will argue that do ut
des is not an accurate understanding of the function of sacrifice in general and in Athens
in particular and that, consequently, Socrates’ criticism of do ut des sacrifice was not
such a large threat.
In the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing something that seems very
much like the do ut des conception of sacrifice. But notice that it is Socrates who calls it
“how to give to [dôreisthai] and beg from” the gods (14c) and then turns it into “a sort of
trading skills [emporikê] between gods and men” (14e). Euthyphro himself presents piety
in terms of charis, a rich concept which refers to the reciprocal relationship between
humans and gods.12 Socrates omits charis from consideration completely when he revises
Euthyphro’s definition, turning it into a trade.13 Euthyphro does not protest, although his
response -- “trading yes, if you prefer to call it that” (14c) -- perhaps suggests a discomfort
with the revision. A more savvy interlocutor might have been able to provide a more
respectable reason for why the Athenians make gifts to the gods.
Cf. also one of his later articles: “Such [sacrificial] practices, however, typically assumed that justice
consists in do ut des reciprocation” (2006, 85).
See 14b where Euthyphro uses cognates of charis twice. For good discussions of charis, see Mikalson
(2010, 24-5), Parker (1998), and Yunis (1988, 101-11).
Cf. Yunis 1988, 101-2.
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Theophrastus for instance argued that people sacrifice to show gods honor, to give them
thanks, and to express their need of benefits (On piety, frag. 12).14 Like Socrates, the do ut
des formula takes these three reasons and collapses them into one: We thank and honor
the gods as payment for the benefits we need from them. But that is not what
Theophrastus said, and it is not what Euthyphro said either.
There are plenty of votive inscriptions and passages in our texts that suggest the do
ut des view. Based on them, it is easy to conclude that sacrifice must be a mere trade. But
was do ut des as dominant as McPherran suggests? McPherran does not offer an argument
for this claim but rather refers to other scholars and especially to Yunis (1988, chapter
3).15 Yunis argues that much religious activity in fact amounted to nothing more than do
ut des transactions and that the do ut des interaction is especially visible in sacrifices,
prayers and votive offerings (1988, 54). In the footnote, he cites van Straten’s discussion
of votives (1981). However, van Straten himself rejects do ut des and argues that we
should view the votive offering as a means “to bring about and sustain a relationship
between man and god” (ibid., 80). Furthermore, despite apparently embracing do ut des in
chapter 3, Yunis actually agrees with van Straten. Later in the book, he argues that
inscriptions on votive offerings “elevate the relationship of dedicator and god beyond a
mere commercial contract to a preferential reciprocity based on mutual esteem” (1988,
103). It is a matter of charis, and so, Yunis concludes, the transaction is “outside the realm
of mere business” (1988, 102).
So what exactly is the difference between do ut des and the view that Yunis and
van Straten are attributing to the Greeks? On Yunis and van Straten’s view, people and
gods are not trading partners but have a relationship of mutual esteem, and they exchange
gifts in order to maintain that relationship. They do not esteem each other because of the
gifts, but the gifts are still important, just as they can be in human relationships. If we
never sacrificed to the gods, our neglect would damage our relationship with them and if
our relationship were damaged, the gods might not help us prosper. But that does not
mean that sacrifices pay for the prosperity as they do on the do ut des view.
Yunis and van Straten are not denying that the relationship between humans and
the gods was reciprocal or that many people were engaging in do ut des transactions. It
was and they did. Their point, rather, is that sacrifice is not reducible to do ut des. Here,
they and I are following the vast majority of scholars in religious studies and related
fields, who argue that sacrifice is more complex than the do ut des conception allows and
that, as just noted, it is more like gift giving than a trade.16
Porphyry On Abstinence 2.24; Pötscher 42-4.
See notes 26, 44, 47, and 85 (2002) where he refers mainly to Yunis (23-58) but also to Dodds (1973,
144-155); Dover (1974, 246-9); Vlastos (1991, 176-177); and Lloyd Jones (1971, 156-64). Lloyd Jones
does not offer any support of do ut des in those pages (or anywhere else in the book, as far as I can tell).
Vlastos and Dover both assume but do not argue for the do ut des view. Dodds presents some evidence, but
it will become clear as I proceed that this evidence can be explained equally well if we view sacrifice as a
gift.
My discussion here will follow van Baal (1976) closely. See also the following: Bremmer: “All this
‘traffic’ between god and man should not be seen in a framework of contract (do ut des), but in one of
goodwill and friendship” (1998, 133); G. S. Kirk: “Scholars are usually content to reduce the whole business
of ... gifts to the over-simple and much-distorted legal principle of do ut des, a tag which serious discussions
of divine ritual could well do without” (1980, 74-5); Mikalson: “[Sacrifice involves a] more subtle and
complex [relationship] than the formula do ut des ... often used to describe it implies” (2010, 24); Parker: “A
very commercial interpretation of kharis is not an error pure and simple; it might, none the
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Gift giving and trade are different in important ways. Unlike trade which is a
limited one-time transaction, a gift also strengthens social relations between giver and
receiver. And indeed, gifts were an important way of establishing relations with people
outside the immediate family in Athens (and elsewhere).17 As van Baal points out, gifts
send a strong message that a trade does not: “[I] regard you as a partner, appreciate you
as a friend, as one who belongs to us” (1976, 167).
Furthermore, if sacrifice were a trade, the gods’ willingness to participate would
seem utterly mysterious because they get so little out of it. As van Baal explains, the
situation appears quite different if we view the sacrifice as a gift. Whereas a trade
presupposes that the goods are of equal value, gifts are often tied to social position, so
that the person in the lower position gives a smaller and the higher person a larger gift.
Since the sacrificer is much inferior to the gods, it makes perfect sense for them to give
him much bigger gifts than he could ever hope to give to them.
Now, van Baal continues, when we make an offering to a god, we ask for a favor
as we hand over the gift. This has suggested to the proponents of a do ut des approach
that the gift is intended to purchase the favor, as if we were handing cash to the cop
together with our license and registration.18 But van Baal argues that this is a
misunderstanding and that given the enormous difference in status and power between
human and god, the request is an appropriate part of the gift (1976, 170). By making a
request, we are highlighting our dependence upon the god and our recognition that, as
Socrates argues in the Euthyphro, the gods really need nothing from us.
Finally, as van Baal cautions, saying that sacrifice is better understood as gift
giving does not mean that every sacrifice was performed as a gift. Exactly because gift
giving is such a powerful way of establishing contacts and improving relations, gifts can
be misused and reduced to more or less overt bribes. While sacrifice at its best can be a
gift which deepens and improves our relationship with the gods, at its worst it can
become a calculating attempt to bribe the gods.
There are many possible motivations for making offerings to the gods, and some
of that variety is displayed on the inscriptions on votive offerings from Socrates’ era.19
Some suggest what sounds like a straightforward do ut des. Others express gratitude.
There are offerings which honor a god. Some of the votives were in memory of the
person presenting the offering. Another yet was inscribed to a god “as proof of [his]
miraculous power, for all to see” (ibid., 77).
It seems reasonable to assume that the motivations of people for sacrificing were
just as varied as the written dedications on the votive offerings and just as varied as
people’s motivation for attending church are today.20 Furthermore, there seems to be no
reason to think that each individual would have only one motive for sacrificing. Our one
autobiographical account, Xenophon’s Anabasis, shows that he sacrificed for a variety of
less be a distortion or drastic over-simplification; and for several reasons those who have argued that it is
are surely in the right” (1998, 118); Price: “Moderns of an anti-ritualistic bent criticize [the relationship
between man and god in a sacrifice] as merely do ut des .... But such criticism misses the point” (1999, 38).
Cf. also Jameson (1988, 975) and Lambert (1993, 310).
Cf. Kirk (1980, 75).
Cf. McPherran: “It was typical to accompany a prayer of request with an offering of some sort designed
to establish a claim on the ‘helper’” (ibid. 165).
See van Straten (1981) for a collection of Greek inscriptions from votive offerings.
Cf. Bremmer (2007, 144), Kirk (1980), and Zaidman and Pantel (1989, 29).
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reasons. Most often, at least when returning from his military adventures, he seems to
have sacrificed to see if the omen were favorable for the action he was considering.21 But
we also see him sacrifice to thank the gods, to ensure a good journey, and to placate a
neglected god.22 Finally, the same individual may well have more than one motive on a
single occasion. In a single sacrifice, he may aim at thanking the gods, putting on a
splendid display that would impress guests from out of town, and at eating meat.
There are occasional hints in McPherran that he recognizes that the do ut des
account may be too facile and that there are other motives for performing sacrifices.23
However, his argument that Socrates indeed was a threat and a revolutionary hinges upon
the assumption that the do ut des view of sacrifice was so dominant that a critique of it
would have been regarded as a serious threat and perhaps even as a wholesale rejection of
the whole institution of sacrifice.24
Let us assume that Socrates were able to persuade everybody in Athens that the
gods are good, that they cannot be bribed, and that they all agree. How would that affect
sacrifice in general? McPherran argues that Socrates’ views threaten sacrifices in three
main ways. First, McPherran argues that “to many Athenians the assistance of a [hero
like] Heracles would have meant, above all, help against the unseen, non-human (and so
less easily dealt with) forces bearing down on one, and for most of them this meant help
against oppressive other deities” (ibid., 174). However, somebody who has accepted
Socrates’ views would regard such help as impossible. Since the gods all agree, one of
them will not help you against another (ibid., 175).
I do not find this argument compelling. McPherran offers no evidence that
Athenians asked for divine help mainly to deal with oppressive deities. Such evidence is
needed, especially since no less an authority than Mikalson argues that the Athenians
generally avoided blaming any bad things on the gods, instead blaming bad fortune or
some daimon (1983, 50, 60). If he is right, Socrates’ view on this point should have struck
them as quite orthodox. Furthermore, even if McPherran were right and Mikalson wrong,
Socrates revisions to Athenian prayer practices on this point seem minor: Instead of
thinking of the cause of the bad things as another deity, which they now would know it
could not be, the Athenians could simply regard the cause as bad luck and continue to ask
for the gods’ help against it.
Second, McPherran argues, Socrates’ reforms meant that we cannot count on the
gods for help with particular bad stuff in life because that bad stuff may well be designed
to help us improve (ibid., 174-5). This would be a radical change, McPherran continues,
since most of the Athenians prayers were requesting help with specific practical problems
(ibid., 165). In my view, though, the possibility that some of these obstacles may have been
put in their way to make them better people would not prevent people from asking
See for instance Anabasis 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 7.6, and 7.8.
See for instance the following: for a good journey (3.1), to thank a god (3.1, 3.3), to placate a god (7.8).
As already noted, McPherran recognizes that some people had nonmercantile motivations. Furthermore, at
one point, he writes that “sacrificial activity was often not so much aimed at obtaining specific goods or
evils as at maintaining an ordered relationship with the gods and ensuring their general good will, a will that
(it was generally agreed) could not be reliably influenced by such activity” (2002, 171). But his argument
does not incorporate this insight.
Socrates was offering “a virtual repudiation of cult, given that the “everyday particularized, materially
oriented and self-interested (even retaliatory) motives” which he so sharply criticized were often the primary
motives in play (2002, 175).
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for help in dealing with them. We do not know whether the obstacle is supposed to be
virtue inducing. If it is, God will not remove it for us, but perhaps He will still help us deal
with it. And if the obstacle is not virtue inducing, perhaps He is just waiting for us to ask
for help with it? In either case, it does not hurt to ask.
Now, McPherran does not discuss it in this context but, as he of course knows,
Socrates also objected to the content of people’s prayers for a different reason: People
often asked for wealth, political power, and honors.25 As Socratics, the content of their
prayers would have to be radically different; they would ask for whatever would improve
the soul and promote virtue. However, this change does not constitute a criticism of prayer
and sacrifice per se. Rather, it is a particular instance of Socrates’ overarching criticism of
Athenian misguided values.26 Thus, this criticism may threaten the Athenian way of life,
but it does not threaten the institution of prayer and sacrifice.
Finally, McPherran argues that the view that the gods are just would make people
significantly less likely to ask for divine help with their more shady dealings (ibid., 170).
Thus, Socrates’ reforms would severely restrict the range of prayer and sacrifice. I am
not persuaded, however, that they would be less likely to ask for help. As McPherran
himself recognizes, the Greeks themselves seem divided on whether the gods would
actually help them to do something bad. This means that at least those who already
agreed with Socrates on this point presumably were already restricting prayer and
sacrifice in the way Socrates suggests that they should. Furthermore, people rarely
describe what they themselves do as unjust and bad. Instead, we usually convince
ourselves that what we are about to do is really good (or at least not bad) and that the
gods therefore will be on our side. This way of thinking seems to be at play in some of
the very passages that McPherran cites (2002, 170) as examples of people asking for help
with unjust enterprises: Medea aimed to exact “just payment with God’s help” (Medea
803; emphasis added). The opening prayer for the Boule included a curse on those who
plotted evil against Athens.
If the Athenians accepted Socrates’ reasons for rejecting do ut des sacrifice, they
would have to abandon do ut des sacrifice but not the sacrifices performed for many of the
other reasons mentioned above. They could continue sacrificing in order to maintain a
good relationship with the gods, to thank them, to praise them, and to divine the future.
Given the multiple and complex motivation for sacrifice, Socrates’ challenge to do ut des
does not seem to be that significant of a threat.
Part 3: Why McPherran’s Socrates still is a threat
Despite all this, I agree that if McPherran’s understanding of Socrates’ views is
accurate, Socrates was a threat to traditional sacrifice. To see why this is so, consider how
McPherran outlines the role that his Socrates would allot to sacrifice: We should indeed
honor the gods and “there is no reason why such actions cannot include thanks-offering
prayers and material sacrifices” (2002, 173). Such prayers are virtuous because they are
attempts to offer good in exchange for good (ibid.). But while prayer and sacrifice are
“compatible” with piety, especially if they are performed with a “correct god-honoring
McPherran notes that the gods would sometimes wait for us to make a request before giving us something
and that they would only grant requests that would be “virtue-aiding” (ibid, 173-4), but he does not in this
context further discuss the Socratic critique of prayers for material goods.
Cf. Apology 29e.
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intention,” they are not “essentially connected” to it (ibid., 172-3). The best way of
honoring the god is through “philosophical self-examination” (ibid. 173). McPherran also
notes that Socrates would probably have recognized that sacrifice has an important social
role (ibid.). It was part of the written and unwritten nomoi of Athens, and it fosters and
maintains the community. In this role, sacrifice remains profoundly important, but it has
nothing to do with the gods; it is all about the relationship between the citizens and
between the citizens and their laws.
This view poses a threat to a more traditional view because while McPherran’s
Socrates does not object to sacrifices, he all but obliterates their significance in our
relationship to the gods. The gods do not mind sacrifices, but they also do not particularly
want them. They appreciate the sentiment of gratitude and honor expressed in the
sacrifice, but they care only about that inner intention and sentiment, not its outward
manifestation. They would rather be honored through philosophy. As McPherran himself
puts it, Socrates and Plato regarded a sacrifice or a prayer as an “epiphenomenon of [the
petitioner’s] inner piety” (ibid., 176). Performing sacrifices is not “sufficient evidence”
that you are pious (ibid.), and refraining does not show that you are impious. This means
that sacrifices are no longer a vital part of how we maintain the relationship with our gods.
They are part of Athenian nomoi but for no good reason. They are, so to speak, mere
custom, and they may become a problem if they take up time that would be better spent
philosophizing. Furthermore, some especially adventurous follower of Socrates might
suggest that the sacrifices impede our relationship with the gods since our continuing the
sacrifices suggests that we have failed to understand what is important.
The demotion of sacrifices to the status of epiphenomena seems unavoidable once
one regards them as external behavior and contrasts them with the all-important state of
the soul. Thus McPherran’s Socrates opens the door to the gradual abandonment of
sacrifice altogether, to be replaced by philosophy and occasional prayers for what we
need for the improvement of our souls. This abandonment would not happen immediately
because if Socrates were in charge, his respect for the nomoi would make him unwilling
to make such a radical change. But given how McPherran’s Socrates regards the
sacrifices, he seems to be in the uncomfortable position of encouraging empty ritual. As
McPherran suggests, Socrates might defend the sacrifices by regarding them not as gifts
to the god but simply as rituals in which a community comes together and is unified and
he might argue that this makes it important to continue them. He might also argue that
sacrifices should continue since they are making us better by “habituating us to return
good for good” (2002, 173). And so, his Athenians might continue these sacrifices
indefinitely. But they might also decide that performing sacrifices to gods who do not
want sacrifices is not the best way of keeping the community together and of making
people better, and so they might replace them with a different means to attain the same
goals.
That this end point would be threatening to the institution of sacrifice should be
obvious. Moreover, the new understanding of piety is a threat from the very beginning.
First and foremost, the view that only the intention behind the sacrifice matters, not the
sacrifice itself, would be deeply objectionable to anybody who regarded sacrifices as more
than epiphenomena. If the actual sacrifices are important and required ways in which we
maintain our relationships with the gods and if we neglect them at our peril,
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then Socrates is dangerously wrong. And this view of sacrifices, as I have previously
argued, was common in Athens.
Regardless of how much of this his fellow citizens saw and understood, Socrates’
view that only the intentions and inner states matter presented a real threat to the
institution of sacrifice. Whatever Socrates’ intentions may have been, his views
encouraged people to neglect the sacrifices, thereby failing to honor the gods and
damaging the city’s relationship with the gods. They invited his followers to make a
radical break with tradition, abandoning the sacrifices that the Athenians had practiced
since time immemorial. Indeed, his new way of honoring the gods through philosophy
instead of sacrifice was different enough that it looked much like a refusal to honor them
at all.
The views about sacrifice and piety that McPherran attributes to Socrates were
radical and different. Regardless of what Socrates himself intended, they could easily be
extended into a call for a virtual abolishment of sacrifices. But were they in fact Socrates’
views? It seems clear that Socrates would have rejected any attempts to bribe the gods and
that he would have argued that sacrifices without a good intention would do no good. It
seems equally clear that he was sure that prayers for excessive wealth, political power,
and honors were fundamentally misguided. But that is an objection to the content of
people’s prayer, not to the practice as such. Did he believe that there was nothing to
sacrifices except a do ut des transaction? The passages from the Euthyphro discussed
earlier in this paper do suggest that he saw them as at worst attempts to buy the gods’
favor and at best as optional manifestations of inner piety, important due to respect for the
nomoi. However, I believe that his view might have been more tentative than that. For
Socrates to conclude that the gods are interested only in our state of mind and that the
sacrifices are not intrinsically important to them amounts to a claim to know the mind of
the gods.27 Given Socrates’ constant expressions of ignorance about such matters, I find it
difficult to believe that he would make such claims, especially since the oracle at Delphi
continually reaffirmed the importance of the sacrifices. The oracle’s support for sacrifices
should have induced Socrates to suspect that they might have an intrinsic value even if he
was unable to see it himself. My guess then is that the historical Socrates would have
shared the sentiment his counterpart expresses in the Republic (427b): Questions about
establishing and abolishing sacrifices should be left in the hands of Apollo because he
knows the value of such sacrifices better than we do.
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